Analysis of National Grid Future Energy Scenarios 2021
Summary of Findings
National Grid’s Future Energy Scenarios 2021 (NG’s FES 2021 ) is a small step forward on their 2020 document. It contains broader, for example considering aviation, shipping and railways (albeit only in terms of emissions, not energy consumption). We agree that “Whole system thinking helps decarbonisation” (p80); indeed, without it, decarbonisation will be unaffordable, impractical, excessively disruptive, unreliable and un-resilient.
Electricity Demand
However the analysis has substantial shortfalls and omissions. In summary, its analysis of the many sources of demand demand:
Under-estimates future energy demand:
◊ Until recently the grid accounted for ~¼ of all UK energy use, with the remainder being used by heating, transportation, industry and other sectors:
Heating will be decarbonised largely by hydrogen (electrolysed using electricity, or chemically formed using electricity) and heat pumps (electricity);
Transportation will be decarbonised largely by electrification and fuel cells (hydrogen, as above);
Industry will be decarbonised largely by electrification, hydrogen heating and hydrogen processes;
Therefore electricity will rise to 75-90% of basic energy supply.
◊ NG recognises the efficiencies of electricity use (e.g. 4x more efficient vehicle transmissions) without recognising the inefficiencies up-stream (e.g. of storage or electrolysis) or increased utilisation (mileage has consistently risen, even if total transportation fuel consumption has not due to improving vehicle efficiency; with the after-effects of the Coronavirus, an increasing proportion of transportation is personal vehicles, with decreasing public transport usage).
◊ But every sector considered under-states future demand; for example:
Consumers are assumed to be unreasonably “prosumers”;
Digitalisation is assumed to be energy-free;
Domestic heating rests on highly questionable assumptions of up-take (constrained by space, as much as anything) and efficiency, and ignores that below certain temperatures heat pumps become progressively less efficient until they stop working;
Transportation relies on excessive EV up-take beyond what the planet’s resources can support, assumes at least 6x over-optimistic V2G support, and ignores ~30% system inefficiencies;
Industrial and Commercial demand concentrates on making plants and processes more efficient but totally ignores the electricity and hydrogen used in creating environmentally friendly fuels, feedstock materials and hydrogen substitution in processes such as iron and steel making.
Electricity Supply
The analysis is equally deficient in its analysis of electricity supply: it
Relies on electricity imports during “times of system stress” (high demand and/or low renewable generation) when most of our neighbours are doing the same concurrently and won’t have a surplus to share;
Assumes nameplate capacity of all generation (baseload, dispatchable and intermittent), interconnectors and storage;
Takes output rating of storage regardless of duration, when shorter-duration (sub-4-hour) storage would be exhausted well before the end of an evening peak during times of system stress;
Over-states distributed and digital solutions’ benefits, which merely redistribute the energy in the system, without ensuring that there is sufficient at all times;
Does not appear to give full consideration of all aspects of biomass energy;
Fails to apply a supply margin, whereas grids world-wide consider a margin of 10-15% above peak worst-forecast demand to be a minimum acceptable;
Therefore under-states the need for storage in general and large-scale, long-duration storage in particular.
Consequences
The result of such predictions, and of regulatory directions, about which Storelectric has repeatedly warned, has been the black-outs of 9th August 2019, numerous near-misses in 2020 and 2021 to date, rocketing costs and complexity of balancing, stability and ancillary services, and a strategy to move faster and further down the same dead end.
The principal views and actions of government, regulator and grid operators have 10-year horizons, and are based on responding to demand. These two factors alone guarantee that the energy transition targets will be missed, and the energy transition itself will be unaffordably expensive and disruptive.
Costs of the Current Strategy
Referring to previous Storelectric studies, the current strategy costs:
Over £1.25bn one-off plus £125m p.a. unnecessary grid reinforcement , and additional (not evaluated) cost of balancing and stability, per GW additional wind generation;
Excess reliance on batteries , of which many are needed to deliver the same services as same-sized large-scale long-duration inertial storage like ours, and moreover, for which there is insufficient elementary lithium, cobalt and rare-earth metals in the earth’s crust – ignoring how much smaller a proportion of which is exploitable;
Excess reliance on imports through interconnectors , which not only will not be available (see above), but also our neighbours will have a political imperative to cut us off during times of system stress;
Excess costs and difficulty of building and integrating renewable generation ;
£328m for 6 years’ synchronous compensation 2020-26 that would be much cheaper if procured from inertial storage with suitable cost-saving revenue stacks;
Complete under-estimate of the need for storage , with
Excess reliance on Vehicle to Grid (V2G) and shared mobility .
In short, it subscribes to most of the fads and fallacies of the energy transition .